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1. IntroductIon.1   The relationship between language and thought is one of the most 
fascinating—and the most controversial—topics in cognitive science. Posed by Whorf 
(1956), the question of whether cross-linguistic differences lead to differences in cognition 
has been studied extensively across a wide range of domains. Recent work on this question 
has come from color perception (Kay, Berlin, Maffi & Merrifield 2003, Winawer et al. 
2007, Roberson & Henley 2007), navigation and spatial language (Hermer & Spelke 1994, 
Levinson, Kita, Haun & Rasch 2002), theory of mind (Pyers & Senghas 2009), gender 
1 Thanks to Mark Donohue for encouraging me to visit Manokwari, Indonesia. I gratefully 
acknowledge all of my collaborators in the work reported here, including Ted Gibson, Evelina 
Fedorenko, Rebecca Saxe, Dan Everett, and David Barner. Thanks also to Susan Carey and Lera 
Boroditsky for valuable discussion of the theoretical ideas presented here. Finally, thanks to 
David Barner, Nick Evans, Ev Fedorenko, Ted Gibson, and two anonymous reviewers for giving 
comments on a previous version of this manuscript.
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The relationship between language and thought has been a focus of 
persistent interest and controversy in cognitive science. Although 
debates about this issue have occurred in many domains, number is 
an ideal case study of this relationship because the details (and even 
the existence) of exact numeral systems vary widely across languages 
and cultures. In this article I describe how cross-linguistic and cross-
cultural diversity—in Amazonia, Melanesia, and around the world—
gives us insight into how systems for representing exact quantities 
affect speakers’ numerical cognition. This body of evidence supports 
the perspective that numerals provide representations for storing and 
manipulating quantity information. In addition, the differing structure 
of quantity representations across cultures can lead to the invention 
of widely varied routines for numerical tasks like enumeration and 
arithmetic.
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(Boroditsky, Schmidt & Phillips 2003), event perception (Papafragou, Hulbert & Trueswell 
2008, Fausey & Boroditsky 2011), object individuation (Lucy 1992, Barner, Li & Snedeker 
2010), categorization (Lupyan, Rakison & McClelland 2007), and many others. Yet despite 
considerable empirical progress, the general form of the relationship between language and 
thought remains hotly contested (Davidoff, Davies & Roberson 1999, Gentner & Goldin-
Meadow 2003, Gumperz & Levinson 1996, Levinson et al. 2002, Li & Gleitman 2002, 
Pinker 1994).
Numerical cognition—and specifically, the use of language to represent large, 
exact quantities—is an exciting case study of this relationship in a domain that is both 
cognitively central and at the core of many technical achievements. Although there has 
been considerable discussion of the role of grammatical number marking as a case study 
of language and thought (e.g. Barner et al. 2010), the ability to represent arbitrarily large, 
exact numbers may have somewhat larger cultural and technical consequences. Hence, this 
review will cover only conventionalized representations that are suitable for representing 
large quantities—numbers like “seven” or “thirty-four”—and the routines that allow us to 
use them.2
The goal of the review is to give a sketch of some cross-cultural evidence on the 
relationship between numerical representations and routines. Rather than attempting to 
perform a comprehensive review of ethnographic evidence, I will instead focus primarily 
on recent psychological work that uses experimental methods in the field. Although 
there is tremendous value in linguistic and ethnographic work on number—and I discuss 
some in the final sections—my hope is to highlight how cross-cultural experiments can 
sharpen hypotheses about the relationship between language and thought by providing 
measurements of behavior in situations where numerical representations vary.
The outline of the review is as follows. I begin by describing background on 
representations and routines for number. I then present studies on numerical cognition in 
the absence of linguistic representations of numbers (evidence from Amazonian languages) 
and cases where language for number is culturally available but either not available to 
individual speakers (in Nicaraguan signers and home-signers) or not available online 
(in the moment in which a task is being performed). This body of evidence supports the 
idea that storing and manipulating exact quantity information depends on having both a 
representation of quantity and a routine for the appropriate task available in the moment 
when they are needed. I finish by surveying some examples of how number representations 
can vary due to cultural demands (examples from Melanesia) and how routines can vary 
depending on the structure of the representations they operate over (focusing on mental 
abacus users in India).
Taken together, the evidence supports a view that my collaborators and I have referred 
to as the “cognitive technology” view (Frank, Everett, Fedorenko & Gibson 2008, Frank, 
2 The term “number” is generally ambiguous between grammatical markings like singular/plural 
and numerals that describe the exact cardinality of sets. Here I will avoid the cumbersome 
language necessary to disambiguate in every instance and use the terms “numbers” and 
“numerical cognition” under the assumption that these terms refer to numerals representing the 
exact cardinalities of large sets and the broad range of cognitive operations that are carried out 
with such sets, respectively.
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Fedorenko, Lai, Saxe & Gibson 2012): that numerical representations are cultural artifacts 
that are used for the online encoding of quantity information. The form of a linguistic or 
cultural representation of number and the efficiency of the routines for manipulating this 
representation each affect what computations are possible using this representation; the 
online availability of this representation (in the moment a computation is desired) is a 
prerequisite for performing the computation. One version of this view was first articulated 
by Kay and Kempton (1984) and it and its variants are currently experiencing a resurgence 
in cognitive science (Dessalegn & Landau 2008, Gentner 2003, Wiese 2007); see e.g. 
Frank et al. (2012) for more detailed discussion.
A secondary goal of this review is to argue for an approach whereby fieldworkers 
supplement standard elicitation techniques with psychological experimentation that tests the 
cognitive consequences of different numerical representations and routines. Because of the 
immense linguistic and cultural diversity in regions like Amazonia and Melanesia and the 
relative isolation of these populations, investigation of numerical systems in these regions’ 
indigenous cultures provides especially rich evidence regarding the range of variation 
in number systems. Melanesia, in particular, is likely to harbour the greatest diversity of 
number systems in the world (Lean 1992). Ethnographic observation and psychological 
observation can play complementary roles in characterizing this diversity, providing both 
naturalistic observations and precise and generalizable measurements. And given the rapid 
decreases in linguistic diversity in these regions (Evans 2009a), it is especially important 
to document not only the facts of languages in Amazonia and Melanesia, but also the 
psychological consequences of these languages for their speakers.
2. RepResentations and Routines foR numbeR.   The past twenty years have seen an 
explosion of interest in representations of exact number as an example of an important, 
uniquely human concept, yet one that is built out of primitive components that can each be 
observed in infants and members of other species (Dehaene 1997, Carey 2009). On the one 
hand, numbers are a key part of every modern society: they facilitate a huge set of human 
behaviors, from complex feats of engineering to economic exchanges using currency. On 
the other, representations of quantity information can be observed in infants, monkeys, fish, 
and a host of other creatures (Gallistel 1993, Xu & Spelke 2000, Hauser et al. 2003). Thus, 
in the domain of number, cognitive scientists can ask how basic cognitive abilities can be 
combined into a sophisticated conceptual system and, in particular, what role language 
plays in this combination.
The basic cognitive systems that provide non-verbal representations of quantity are 
now well established (Feigenson, Dehaene & Spelke 2004). The first is a system that can 
track the location and identity of up to three or four objects at a time, likely based in visual 
attention or tracking. The second is the approximate number system (ANS), which can 
represent the approximate magnitude of sets of objects but not the identities of individuals 
within these sets. Despite the presence of both of these systems in prelinguistic infants, 
learning how to use linguistic numerals is a protracted process. In typically-developing 
English-speaking children, the time period from learning the meaning of “one” to mastering 
the use of number words up to “ten” can last a year or more (Wynn 1990).
Despite consensus about the basic facts, the role of language is contested in both this 
developmental progression and its end result. On the “bootstrapping” account, learning 
the meanings of numerals in the count list is a result of first mapping number words from 
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“one” up to “three” or “four” onto small number representations, and then performing an 
inductive step that recognizes the parallel between the sequential relationship between the 
words in the count list and the sequential relationship inherent in their definitions. The 
specifics of language—both in the structure of the count list and in the use of number 
names as placeholders for concepts—play an essential role in this account (Carey 2009, 
Piantadosi, Tenenbaum & Goodman 2012). In contrast, the “mapping” view suggests that 
words like “four” or “seven” are defined in terms of innate number concepts, and identified 
either noisily, using the ANS, or precisely, using a count routine. On this kind of account, 
language plays a peripheral role: it does not help to create new concepts, it simply helps 
to name and recognize pre-existing concepts by using enumeration routines like counting 
(Gelman & Gallistel 1978).
One broad area of agreement between these views, however, is the distinction between 
numerical representations and numerical routines, and the importance of their interaction 
in allowing their users to store and manipulate exact quantities (Gelman & Butterworth 
2005, Carey 2009). By numerical representation, I mean here a set of symbols used for the 
task of representing exact quantities. The choice of a representation of number includes 
the medium of representation (linguistic, like a count list; externalized, like a counting 
stick; or even supported by visual imagery, like a mental abacus representation) and the 
internal structure of these representations (e.g. that English speakers say “ninety-nine” 
= 90 + 9 to mean 99, while French speakers say “quatre-vingt-dix-neuf” = 4 * 20 + 10 
+ 9). By numerical routine, I mean an algorithm that is commonly used to leverage such 
a representation in a particular numerical task. Examples of routines range from simple 
enumeration to the complex sets of steps that schoolchildren are taught to follow in order 
to perform addition or division of large quantities.
3. numeRical abilities without RepResentations of exact numbeR.   What is 
numerical cognition like in the absence of linguistic numerals in a language?3 Are there 
any routines for manipulation of exact quantity that are possible in the absence of exact 
numerical representations? This section reviews recent work with the Mundurukú and 
Pirahã, two indigenous groups in Brazil, that explores the cognitive consequences of 
speaking a language with limited or no vocabulary for exact quantities.
3.1. measuRing numbeR vocabulaRy.   Gordon (2004) claimed that Pirahã had a 
counting system consisting of words for the quantities 1 (hói) and 2 (hoí) as well as a word 
for “many” (aibaagi).4 He reported data from only a single elicitation (in which a speaker 
3 The question of what it means to have exact numerals in a language is ambiguous: an individual 
speaker can in principle have access to a particular, idiosyncratic mapping between symbols 
and quantities; or a mapping can be conventionalized and available to many or all speakers of 
a language. Although there are cases of idiosyncratic or heterogeneous number systems (for 
preliminary data on this issue, see e.g. Frank & Honeyman 2011), the examples discussed here all 
show relatively broad consensus across speakers, shown via experimental procedures used with a 
sample of individuals from the community.
4 Here and throughout the article I will use the Arabic numerals as a shorthand for the expression 
“the quantity N” regardless of whether the quantity is large or small, rather than following 
standard typographical conventions (“one” vs. 11) depending on quantity. I will quote numbers 
like “seven” to refer to a word for a quantity.
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used the “two” word hoí to refer to the quantities 3 and 4). These data were broadly in 
accordance with a description of Pirahã as a “one, two, many” language, a type found in 
other non-industrialized societies (Menninger 1969, Hammarström 2010).
In their work on Mundurukú, Pica, Lemer, Izard, and Dehaene (2004) performed a 
structured elicitation experiment. They presented sets of 1–15 dots in random order to adults 
and children and asked how many dots were present in each set. Mundurukú participants 
responded consistently with a set of conventionalized terms for the quantities 1–3. These 
terms were used by participants in nearly all cases. For 4, participants used a conventional 
term almost as often, but occasionally used the same term to refer to 5 and 6. For 5, 25% of 
participants used a term meaning “one hand,” while 35% of others used a vaguer term that 
Pica and colleagues translated as “some, not many” and that was used for other quantities 
5–15 as well. Above 5, only this latter term and a term meaning “many” were used with 
any frequency. This experiment gives evidence that Mundurukú does have some exact 
numerals, but lacks a recursive number naming system and exact number vocabulary for 
large quantities.5
Following on Gordon (2004), our own work revealed a different view of Pirahã quantity 
vocabulary, using a structured elicitation task like Pica et al. (2004). We showed participants 
sets of objects and asked “how much/many are there?”, increasing the cardinalities of the 
set from 1–10 and then decreasing from 10–1 (or vice versa). We found that the quantities 
for which our participants used particular words changed depending on the context of the 
elicitation (increasing vs. decreasing). In particular, although participants used hói only 
for 1 in the increasing context, they used it for up to 6 objects in the decreasing elicitation. 
This context effect strongly suggests that hói is not a word for 1. On our view, the most 
likely conclusion from these data is that it is a relative term like “few,” “fewer,” or even 
“small.” Another possible position, however, is that hói is polysemous between “one” 
and “a few”; this view is of course logically possible, but provides no account of why or 
under what conditions an exact meaning would be available. The three words documented 
by Gordon are confirmed by several non-native Pirahã speakers to be the only words for 
quantities, leading us to conclude that Pirahã seems to have no (unambiguous) words for 
exact numbers: not even a word for 1.
The Amazonian findings suggest that representations of exact quantities are not a 
linguistic universal. In addition, they raise the intriguing question of whether any other 
languages without numerals have been misclassified as “one, two, many” languages due 
to the absence of experimental data.6  In order to determine the semantics of possible 
numerals, single-participant elicitations should be replaced with structured elicitations and 
numeral comprehension tasks (Wynn 1990). Even data for a handful of participants in 
5 Note that for developmental researchers, the gold standard for children having acquired the 
meaning of a numeral for 7 is success in comprehension-based tasks like “give a number” (Wynn 
1990, Le Corre et al. 2006, Condry & Spelke 2008). In the “give a number” task, participants are 
simply asked to “give me N objects” and the cardinality of the set they give is reported. Neither 
the Mundurukú nor the Pirahã have been tested on such a task, so more work remains to be done 
to probe the meanings of the attested vocabulary items.
6  Hammarström (2010) gives a list of other languages that have such systems and notes this 
possibility, though Pirahã may be the only one of these that lacks any singular-plural marking as 
well.
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such tasks can be informative and can provide an inexpensive supplement to current field 
methods.
3.2 consequences of limited numbeR vocabulaRy.   In contrast with linguistic 
representations of number, which vary across societies, a large body of evidence shows that 
an approximate number sense (ANS) is available to all human beings as well as members 
of other species. This approximate sense leads us to be able to make estimates of a set’s 
quantities without using an enumeration routine.
The ANS has been characterized extensively in human and non-human animals (for 
review see Feigenson et al. 2004, Gallistel 1993). Estimates of quantity made by the ANS 
follow Weber’s law (e.g. Whalen, Gallistel & Gelman 1999, Xu 2002), which states that 
the probability of a correct response in a discrimination task is related to the magnitude 
of the stimulus being discriminated. Weber’s law leads to the prediction of the relation 
σ/µ = c in participants’ data, where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the 
magnitude estimates (across trials or participants) and c is a constant holding across a 
range of magnitudes. The term c is often referred to as the coefficient of variation or COV. 
A constant COV implies that the larger the quantity being estimated, the larger the average 
error, in turn signaling that the ANS is being used.
In Pica et al.’s study, Mundurukú participants and French controls performed 
comparison, addition, and subtraction tasks. When participants were asked to choose the 
larger of two large sets of dots (and were not given enough time to count), both groups 
performed similarly, showing a constant COV, consistent with Weber’s law. However 
when participants were asked to give the resulting quantity in a subtraction paradigm 
where objects were first added to and then subtracted from an opaque container, French 
participants performed nearly perfectly, while the Mundurukú made errors that were again 
consistent with the operation of the ANS. Crucially, the design of this task required only 
responses in the range where the Mundurukú could have responded verbally (quantities 
0–2), ruling out the explanation that they could not indicate the correct response even 
though they knew it.
Like the Mundurukú, the Pirahã also relied on the ANS to perform numerical tasks. 
Gordon (2004) performed a range of matching tasks designed to probe the ability of 
participants to store and manipulate exact quantities. In the simplest task, participants were 
asked to produce a 1–1 match between two sets by selecting the correct quantity of objects 
to align with a target set. In more difficult tasks, the target set was presented in a cluster or 
was presented only briefly, and participants were again asked to produce a target set of the 
same cardinality. Participants made errors in all tasks, even the 1–1 match task, although 
their errors were larger in those tasks where the target set was presented for a short period 
of time. When Gordon consolidated data across all tasks, the pattern of responses again 
showed a constant COV. Like the Mundurukú results, these findings suggest that analog 
estimation using the ANS is the default strategy in situations where no count list is available.
Both sets of results left open an important question, however: did Mundurukú and 
Pirahã participants understand that large quantities could be exact, even if they did not 
know how to express or manipulate them? For example, Gordon’s 1–1 matching task was 
the simplest task in either assessment, yet Pirahã still made errors. Were these errors due 
to confusion about what was being asked or difficulties in completing the task, or were 
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they instead due to a more fundamental conceptual difference? On the first interpretation, 
the Pirahã made errors in matching up larger quantities of objects either because they 
did not understand that an exact response was called for (even though they could have 
produced such a response) or because they made manual errors in alignment even though 
they understood what was being asked of them. On the second interpretation, however, the 
Pirahã did not understand that a correct response required matching exactly, because they 
did not even have available a concept of exact equivalence.
The actual computational demands for success in the 1–1 matching task are quite low. 
In order to succeed, it is only necessary to match individuals until there are no more left 
to match. This task can be accomplished without ever representing the total quantity, so 
success in the task does not demonstrate the existence of exact quantity representations. A 
1–1 match of exactly 7 items can be performed without ever mentally representing 7. On 
the other hand, a true failure in the task—an inability to select the 1–1 matching algorithm, 
even with appropriate training and unlimited time—would suggest that the Pirahã truly did 
not think in terms of exact equivalence or exact matches.
On a recent visit to the Pirahã, my collaborators and I replicated a number of Gordon’s 
tasks with a larger sample of participants (N=14, as opposed to N=5 in the previous study). 
In order to ensure task understanding, we included a systematic training phase in which we 
demonstrated what the correct response would be for one trial with a small quantity and 
then gave corrective feedback on another set of small-quantity trials until participants were 
performing consistently (Frank et al. 2008). In the more difficult matching tasks, we found 
precisely the pattern of ANS usage that Gordon documented, with errors increasing along 
with the quantity of objects being estimated (see figure 1 for an example of the testing 
environment). Our results differed from Gordon’s in the 1–1 matching task, however. 
There, only one participant made any errors and the rest performed perfectly, suggesting 
that this task was qualitatively different from the others. Despite not having linguistic 
representations of exact quantities available to them, this group of Pirahã understood that 
an exact response was required. This result shows that our participants made the appropriate 
generalization from a few training examples with small numbers: that every target item 
should be matched with exactly one item, not that the two sets should match approximately. 
That they made this generalization consistently across individuals strongly suggests that 
the notion of an exact, rather than approximate, 1–1 match was available to them (though 
again, not the representation of a particular exact quantity like 7).
One final dataset bears on this question, however. Everett and Madora (2012) conducted 
a replication of our previous work with another group of Pirahã from a different village. 
Although they again replicated the pattern of ANS usage on more complex matching tasks, 
they found results congruent with Gordon’s: their participants made systematic errors 
on the 1–1 matching tasks. Everett and Madora argued that the success of the particular 
participants in our 2008 experiments was due to exposure that members of this village had 
to innovated number words and numerical procedures. Apparently, Madora had conducted 
numerical training sessions with the members of this village; nevertheless, our elicitation 
tasks showed no evidence for knowledge of innovated number words. This claim brings 
up an interesting possibility: could it be that exposure to some representations of exact 
number— even without the long-term adoption of these representations—facilitates the 
construction of a 1–1 match strategy? Although the current data do not provide enough 
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information to evaluate this claim, perhaps it can be assessed via future developmental or 
cross-cultural work.
FIgure 1. A Pirahã participant in Frank et al. (2008), in the orthogonal match 
condition. The experimenters have placed 10 spools of thread, and the participant 
has matched them with 9 balloons.
To summarize, evidence from the Pirahã and Mundurukú demonstrates that in cultures 
without representations of large exact quantities, individuals are not able to remember 
or manipulate such quantities exactly, suggesting a connection between linguistic 
representations and the ability to create routines for manipulating exact number. Instead of 
remembering exact quantities, both groups used an estimation strategy which allowed for 
approximately correct responses even in relatively difficult tasks. Nevertheless, evidence 
from the Pirahã suggests that it is possible to create and use a routine for exact, 1–1 match 
even without an unambiguous linguistic representation of 1.
4. distinguishing cognition fRom cultuRal exposuRe in numbeR RepResentation. 
The evidence above suggests that routines for storing and manipulating exact quantities 
correlate with the cultural presence of linguistic representations of number, but the precise 
nature of this correlation is unknown. One possibility is that language for number could 
simply co-occur with cultural routines for number, rather than being a causal factor in the 
cognition of individual speakers. On this kind of account, language for number would 
develop alongside a set of (possibly non-verbal) routines for manipulating exact quantities, 
springing from the same basic cultural needs. Speakers would learn number words, but 
they would also learn algorithms for doing matching tasks, for chunking large quantities 
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into sets of smaller quantities, and for tallying to keep track of quantities over time. For 
example, the use of an abacus would constitute a parallel, non-linguistic routine that could 
support numerical calculation (see below for more details). On the other hand, another 
possibility is that language for number could be necessary in the moment for the precise 
manipulation of exact quantities: that is, language could be a necessary constituent in these 
routines (like in the case of verbal arithmetic, but unlike in the case of an abacus).
Recent studies have begun to differentiate between these two accounts. First, work 
with signers in Nicaragua has investigated the numerical abilities of individuals in a highly 
numerate culture who nonetheless have limited representations of exact number and limited 
routines for manipulating these representations. Second, psychophysical experimentation 
with verbal interference tasks has begun to manipulate the online availability of linguistic 
representations of exact number in highly numerate, educated adults. These two sets of 
studies are reviewed below.
4.1. cultuRal exposuRe alone does not scaffold exact numbeR.   Nicaraguan 
Sign Language (NSL) is a new sign language created over the last 30 years as specialized 
schools have brought together the community of deaf individuals in Nicaragua (Senghas, 
Kita & Ozyurek 2004). As the Nicaraguan deaf community has grown and the age at which 
children are exposed has become younger, NSL has evolved into a fully-featured, highly 
grammaticized language that includes number words, complex spatial language (Senghas 
& Coppola 2001) and sophisticated constructions for reporting the thoughts of others 
(Pyers & Senghas 2009).
Since NSL speakers live in a numerate community, playing gambling games and using 
money, they have ample opportunities to acquire numerical routines. Nevertheless, number 
signs in NSL underwent rapid standardization in the early 1990s, transforming from iconic 
finger signs—with a number of fingers corresponding to the quantity being indicated—to a 
set of simpler, one-handed signs that are less iconic. This change has created a population 
of speakers with a range of experience with numbers signs: there are older adults who did 
not learn either system as children; younger adults who learned the iconic system but have 
since learned the second system; and adolescents who learned the second system during 
childhood (Flaherty & Senghas 2011). By keeping cultural exposure relatively constant 
but varying linguistic representation, the case of NSL thus presents an opportunity to test 
whether cultural exposure to numerical routines is sufficient for accurate performance of 
numerical tasks or whether it is necessary to have linguistic representations in order to 
acquire or carry out numerical routines.
Flaherty and Senghas (2011) tested NSL speakers across the full range of ages on 
a set of tasks that included matching tasks like those used by Gordon (2004) as well as 
tasks requiring tapping out quantities, counting and selecting sets using number words, and 
translating between monetary notes and coins. Across all tasks, the group that made far and 
away the most errors were the older adults that had not fully mastered even the iconic count 
lists. Individuals who had mastered either count list made small but systematic errors—
indicating that they were not perfectly accurate in using their count routine in challenging 
situations— but the performance of older adults who could not count differed significantly 
from even that of the older adults who had been able to master the iconic count routine.
In addition, as with the Pirahã, all NSL participants—even the non-counters—
succeeded in grasping the simplest 1–1 matching tasks. When matching tasks became more 
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complex and the stimuli being matched were presented ephemerally (via tapping, or via 
putting items one by one into an opaque cup), accuracy was considerably lower for the non-
counters. The non-counters knew that there was something they did not know, however—
they expressed uncertainty about larger quantities, and had developed heuristic strategies 
for making change in the monetary tasks. They knew that an exact answer was required, 
but did not know how to calculate that answer. Thus, like the Pirahã, NSL speakers without 
a count routine were able to select an exact quantity matching strategy, even in the absence 
of a reliable method for mentally representing individual quantities.
Although many deaf children in Nicaragua are now given opportunities to learn NSL, 
there are still some individuals who have not had access to the broader deaf community 
and have instead built up more idiosyncratic sign systems for communicating with their 
families and more immediate community. “Homesign” systems of this sort and their 
relationship to conventional language have been studied extensively, in the US and around 
the world (Goldin-Meadow & Mylander 1984). Recent work by Spaepen, Coppola, 
Spelke, Carey and Goldin-Meadow (2011) investigates numerical cognition in Nicaraguan 
homesigners. Congruent with the work with NSL speakers, Spaepen and colleagues found 
that homesigners, who could not produce a consistent count list or perform matching tasks, 
were still able to compare monetary denominations with high accuracy.
In addition, although they could not produce a correct ordering of number signs, the 
homesigners did still know words for exact quantities. This knowledge allowed Spaepen 
and colleagues to perform an important exact numerosity recognition task. In this task, the 
homesigners were told that some exact number of objects were in a box, and then the array 
in the box was transformed (either via a change in the number of objects or not). When the 
transformation did not change the quantity in the box, the homesigners almost always used 
the same gesture as the experimenter; when the transformation did change the quantity, 
they never used the same gesture. Ruling out a pragmatic explanation for this behavior 
(e.g., applying the principle of contrast; Clark, 1988), nearly all participants used gestures 
that matched the direction of the transformation, for example signaling a larger number 
than the original gesture when an object had been added to the set. This task gives clear 
evidence that the homesigners understood that each set had an exact numerical value, even 
if they did not have an errorless routine for finding that value.
Although both NSL users and homesigners grew up in a highly numerate culture, this 
fact alone did not create the concepts and routines necessary to succeed in complex exact 
number tasks. In addition, supporting the Pirahã 1–1 matching results, the Nicaraguan data 
suggest that neither number words nor a count routine are necessary to understand the idea 
that a set has an exact quantity, even if that quantity cannot be named or stored in memory.
While the Nicaraguan data implicate linguistic representations (rather than cultural 
exposure to routines) as playing a causal role in the ability to manipulate exact quantities, 
it is a separate question whether this role is online. In other words, for an individual with a 
lifetime of practice representing exact quantities, does representing a quantity like 7 require 
the use of language in the moment such that if linguistic resources were not available at 
that moment, this task would become much more difficult or impossible? To answer this 
question, we turn to psychophysical tasks performed with numerate English speakers.
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4.2. numbeR woRds must be available online foR enumeRation.   Verbal 
interference methods have been used widely for testing the online dependence of various 
tasks on language (Newton & de Villiers 2007, Winawer et al. 2007, Hermer-Vazquez, 
Spelke & Katsnelson 1999). Verbal interference refers to a class of experimental paradigms 
in which participants are asked to perform a task while simultaneously occupying their 
verbal system by performing a separate verbal task, such as repeating a word like “the,” 
repeating strings of numbers, or “shadowing” (repeating words after immediately after 
hearing them spoken on a recording). As a control for the generalized dual-task cost of 
performing two tasks at once (Pashler 1994), performance in the target task under verbal 
interference is often compared to performance in the target task paired with a non-verbal 
task like shadowing a clapped pattern.
A handful of studies have used verbal interference to measure numerical behavior. 
However, most have done so using number tasks that were themselves verbal. For 
example, Logie and Baddeley (1987) found that rapid repetition of “the” caused more 
errors in counting than either listening to speech or tapping a finger, suggesting that active 
speech production interfered with use of the same system to count. A more recent study 
by Cordes, Gelman, Gallistel and Whalen (2001) showed an Arabic numeral and asked 
participants to press a key that number of times while either repeating “the” or counting 
very quickly. They found that participants under verbal suppression showed a constant 
coefficient of variation—indicating use of the ANS—while those who were counting 
showed a decreasing COV (perhaps caused by the binomial errors implied by skipping 
numbers in the count list). These two studies give evidence that language interference does 
cause participants to make errors when aspects of the task are linguistic, but leaves open 
the possibility of better performance in purely non-linguistic tasks.
In order to test this possibility, my colleagues and I conducted a series of experiments 
where we replicated the matching tasks used with the Pirahã, performing these tasks with 
a group of English speakers who were simultaneously shadowing complex texts (Frank et 
al. 2012). This paradigm had the benefit of using a purely nonverbal measure of number 
knowledge and of providing data that could be compared directly to those collected during 
fieldwork with the Pirahã. Our results suggested strong parallels between the performance 
of the English speakers—who did not have number language available in the moment—
and that of the Pirahã—who had never known words for numbers. Like the Pirahã (and 
Nicaraguan populations), the English speakers under verbal interference were able to do 
the 1–1 matching task with relatively few errors. In addition, the English speakers, like the 
other populations, showed evidence of relying on the ANS in the hardest matching tasks. 
Followup experiments using matched verbal and spatial memory interference tasks showed 
that this pattern was specific to language interference.
However, the English speakers also showed some differences from the Pirahã. In 
the medium-difficulty matching tasks where there were visual cues (e.g., matching the 
quantities of two orthogonal lines), they made errors but their overall performance did 
not show the signature of the ANS (a constant relationship between the quantities being 
matched and the magnitudes of the errors in estimation). Instead, the magnitude of the errors 
increased with respect to the quantity being matched. We posited that their errors resulted 
from the use of ad hoc matching routines like making correspondences between sub-groups 
of objects. This same pattern of increasing errors was observed in the Nicaraguan signers 
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who did know a count list, indicating that this pattern of data may generally result from the 
application of fallible routines.
More broadly, the picture that emerges from the evidence so far suggests an online, 
causal role for language in the representation of number information. Evidence gathered 
through psycholinguistic fieldwork, in combination with laboratory control tasks, suggests 
that representing 7 requires having some internal symbol like “seven” available in the 
moment. This pattern of evidence should not suggest that there is no role for cultural needs 
in the creation of numerical routines, however. The next section gives several ethnographic 
examples of interactions between culture and numerical representations and routines.
5. numeRical RepResentations and Routines can be shaped by cultuRe.   A 
common perspective on English numerals—even from sophisticated, numerate adults—is 
that they are transparent linguistic tools that do not reflect an idiosyncratic evolutionary 
process driven by specific cultural needs. Yet a closer look at the diversity of count systems 
in the world’s languages falsifies this view. While the examples discussed below only 
provide an existence proof for cultural effects on representational systems, it is a goal 
for future research to understand both the prevalence of such effects and the mechanisms 
by which cultural demands can lead to representational innovations. For example, Wiese 
(2007) gives an account of how number concepts and numerals evolve in concert; her 
ideas leave open several places where specific cultural demands could lead to particular 
representational idiosyncrasies over the evolution of a count list. Thus, my hope is that 
discussing examples of possible links between culture and number representation can give 
some insight into how this relationship could function. I give three examples below.
First, the ways that numerals are named can change in response to the needs of 
individuals in a culture. For example, in Mangarevan, a language spoken on an island in 
French Polynesia, tools, breadfruit, and octopus are each counted with different sequences 
(Beller & Bender 2008). The Mangarevan language includes an abstract counting system 
that extends to high numbers, but it also includes three different systems for applying this 
list to different kinds of objects. These different systems rename the basic count unit to be 
groups of 2, 4, or 8 of an object, allowing for much more efficient grouping and counting 
of large numbers of objects. Beller and Bender argue that this division reflects a case in 
which a single number system has fragmented into a number of task-specific systems. 
Although each system incorporates properties of the more abstract count list, the need for 
greater efficiency and accuracy in specific situations led to the move away from a single, 
abstract system.
Second, the entire structure of a count system can be determined by a sufficiently 
important cultural practice. The vast majority of the world’s count lists are structured 
around bases that are 5, 10, or 20 (Hammarström 2010), presumably because human beings 
have five digits on our hands and feet (and 20 digits overall). Base-5, base-10, and base-20 
systems interact with and are supported by finger- and toe-counting routines. The languages 
of the Morehead-Maro region of Papua New Guinea have received considerable recent 
attention, however, because they are base-6, an extremely rare pattern (Donohue 2008, 
Hammarström 2009, Evans 2009b). Many of them include lexical items for relatively high 
exponents, e.g. up to 65 or 66 in Keraakie. Evans (2009b) and Hammarström (2009) give a 
compelling account of the origins of this system: it is specialized for the counting of yams, 
which can be arranged for storage in a petal-like configuration. In addition, in an interesting 
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twist, the base-6 representation leads to a reinterpretation of finger-counting routines: these 
routines become base-6 as well, using the wrist as a final location and re-construing the 
finger count as a count of “attachment points” (finger joints and wrist joint) (Evans 2009b). 
In this way, finger-counting is reinterpreted with respect to the base-6 representation that 
has evolved (or been invented) to support an important cultural routine.
Third, changes to a numerical representation can also be motivated directly through 
changes in cultural routines. A specific example of this kind of comes from Saxe (1982). 
He documented that speakers of Oksapmin, a language spoken in the West Sepik province 
of Papua New Guinea, used a body-count system (a common type in the region (Lean 
1992)). This count system was base-27, extending from one hand along the arm, over 
the head, and through the other arm to the other hand. However, when users of this count 
system had limited experience with manipulating money, they made systematic errors in 
simple addition problems (e.g. 8 + 6). Saxe found that although they could count out the 
first addend (8), these inexperienced users had not developed a correspondence strategy so 
that they could keep track of the number of body parts in the second addend (6).
Users more experienced with money manipulation had developed a number of 
strategies to circumvent this problem, however, including counting both the second addend 
and the sum of the addends in parallel, and splitting the body in two and using the second 
arm to track the second addend. The body-splitting strategy was most successful; it was 
used by the participants that were most experienced with money manipulation, but also 
required the most adaptation of the existing representation. To use it, Saxe’s participants 
had to reverse the count list so that it could be initiated from either arm. Saxe’s study 
beautifully demonstrates how cultural pressures can lead to the creation of new routines for 
arithmetic and can in turn lead to changes in the base representation.
Body count systems also suggest how the choice of a base—or more generally the design 
of a number representation—can interfere with the development of efficient routines. In the 
case of Oksapmin, the base was so high that the enumeration routine required both hands 
and hence could not be easily used to create two separate buffers for addition. This example 
is minor, however, compared with counting systems like one reported to be used by some 
speakers of One. This system, described by Donohue (2008), is in principle recursive and 
infinite, but in practice so cumbersome that it is rarely used to count quantities larger than a 
handful. One has individual lexical items for 1 and 2, but allows specific, conventionalized 
combinations of these words up to 6. Their count list admits the following combinations 
1, 2, 2+1, 2+2, 2+2+1, and (2+1)+(2+1), but not (for example) 2+2+2. Although this 
system could be used to express 7, 10, or even 20, it quickly becomes impractical for 
larger quantities. This system may even be a recent innovation and hence indicative of a 
community whose use of numbers is in flux (Crowther 2001).
These examples give a flavor for the ways in which the vast range of number 
representations and routines in the world’s languages can be shaped by their cultural 
context. Nevertheless, understanding the specific cognitive consequences of this variation 
will require significant experimental fieldwork, and the form of the relationship between 
particular numerical representations and the routines they support is mostly unknown. The 
last section of this review gives some evidence on this question by exploring a case study 
of a number representation that licenses a very different set of routines—in a different 
medium—from the others we have reviewed: mental abacus.
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6. non-linguistic RepResentations: effects of RepResentation stRuctuRe on 
Routine.   This review began by asking about the relationship between language and thought 
and explored this relationship through the diversity in number representations across the 
world’s languages. But in fact there is a wide variety of non-linguistic representations used 
across different cultures. Aside from finger-count systems, Menninger (1969) describes the 
near-universal use in the ancient world of tally sticks and knot-based systems to keep track 
of large quantities. In many cases, tally-based systems evolved into the use of counting 
boards—devices that allowed for the grouping of tally objects like pebbles. Unlike most 
tally systems, counting boards incorporated the use of place value (in which a particular 
position in a notation stands for the order of magnitude of symbols in that position, e.g. 1= 
101, 10 = 102, 100 = 103), a major innovation that allowed them to be used flexibly for a 
wide variety of record keeping.
The modern Soroban abacus (primarily used in Japan and China) likely evolved from 
Roman counting boards. Like these counting boards, the Soroban abacus uses a base-10 
representation with place values mapped to individual abacus columns. The abacus (and 
some of the most sophisticated counting boards) incorporates a subsidiary base-5 as well, 
however: on a standard Soroban each column has a single bead on top that represents 5 
units in that place value, and four beads on the bottom that each represent 1 in that place 
value. Combinations of these beads allow the quantities 0–9 to be represented using a 
maximum of five beads.
 Like tally sticks and other enumeration devices, counting boards and abacuses are 
external devices that allow their users to enumerate large exact quantities and retain them 
precisely over long periods of time. However, the abacus allows users to go beyond the 
simple enumeration task by allowing the development and use of efficient routines for 
arithmetic computation. Using the base-5 within-column representation and base-10 place 
value system, large computations can be broken into many small steps consisting of the 
addition of numbers below 5 and a corresponding set of “carry” operations (in which 
the parts of a result greater than 9 are transferred to the next highest place value). With 
practice, abacus calculations can become routinized and highly accurate. In a head-to-head 
competition in post-war Japan, a skilled abacus operator out-computed a calculator user 
(Kojima 1954). Crucially, abacus addition operates via a routine using set of memorized 
operations that are different from the commonly used base-10 addition operations.
 Although abacus is an external computation aid, experienced abacus users can learn to 
internalize the abacus representation and make computations by manipulating beads on a 
mental image of an abacus. This technique, known as mental abacus (MA), is widely taught 
in Japan and has been the focus of recent interest in math supplementary education programs 
in Malaysia, India, China, and a number of other countries in Asia and the Middle East. 
Studies of MA have suggested that users do truly represent a mental abacus using visual 
imagery (Hatano 1977, Hatano & Osawa 1983, Stigler 1984). For example, they make off-
by-5 errors far more than would be expected in standard linguistic calculation, indicating 
that they are inadvertently “dropping” the 5 bead from their mental representation. MA 
users also seem to be able to compute while performing linguistic distractor tasks (Hatano 
1977) and neuroimaging studies confirm that MA activity induces activity in cortical areas 
related to visuo-spatial working memory (Tanaka et al. 2002, Chen et al. 2006). MA is also 
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highly effective as an arithmetic method: a MA user took top honors in the 2010 World Cup 
of Mental Computation.
 Our own recent work investigated how it is that MA representations are possible, given 
the attested limits on numerical representation in the visual system (Frank & Barner 2011). 
Neither of the two systems traditionally implicated in visual number processing (object 
processing for small numbers up to 4, approximate representations above that) would be 
able to represent a number like 49 on the abacus, since this would require representing the 
exact positions of 9 beads. Despite this, MA users are able to do impressive computations 
with far larger numbers. For a visual comparison of abacus computation and MA, see 
figure 2.
FIgure 2. (left) A child performing a physical abacus computation. (right) The same child 
performing a mental abacus computation.
We tested a large group of children (ages 7–16 years) in Gujarat, India, who were 
enrolled in MA afterschool programs. We asked these children to do two standard MA 
tasks—addition of quantities and translation of abacus configurations into Arabic numerals—
while we varied the difficulty of the tasks. In both tasks, we found that the limitations on 
performance came from the number of columns on the abacus representation—in other 
words, the maximum place value—rather than on other features of a given task. For 
example, many participants were able to add between 7 and 9 two-digit addends together 
in under 10 seconds, but very few were able to add 2 four-digit addends in the same time 
period. In contrast, the number of beads necessary to make a representation (e.g., whether a 
column showed a number like 0, with 0 beads, or 9, with five beads) in these problems did 
not seem to affect performance, once the number of columns was controlled.
To test the dependence of MA computations on language, we asked MA experts to 
perform verbal interference tasks as they did mental computations. While their performance 
was impaired slightly by verbal shadowing, they were if anything more impaired by 
simply tapping their fingers during the computation (presumably due to the reliance of the 
computation on the accompanying gestures, see figure 2). In contrast, a group of American 
college students—who used linguistic calculation strategies to do mental arithmetic—were 
highly impaired by verbal interference but experienced no interference from tapping their 
fingers.
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 The interference data suggest that MA is a fundamentally visual representation, while 
performance in the addition experiments described above suggest that MA representations 
are column-based. We hypothesize that each column in the mental abacus is mapped to a 
separate object representation in visual working memory, though the substructure of how 
each column is represented is still unknown. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that 
novice abacus users showed some of the same signatures of column-based organization, 
suggesting that this non-linguistic format for number was adapted to the general visual 
capacities of its users, rather than being the result of extensive practice. Taken together, 
these data paint a picture of MA as a visual alternative to linguistic number representations 
that relies on the distinct structure of visual working memory, rather than phonological 
working memory (as in language-based techniques for mental arithmetic).
 The example of MA goes beyond external physical representations of number like 
counting boards and gives strong evidence that the mental representation of exact quantity 
is possible in mediums other than language. Although some authors have speculated that 
language and exact number rely on the same computational substrate (Hauser et al. 2003), 
the facility and flexibility in computation shown by MA users suggests a different view. 
Representations of exact number can be constructed using a variety of different resources—
linguistic or visual. In addition, the specific organization of the abacus/MA representation 
is tailored to allow computations to be decomposed into many simple operations that can 
be practiced independently. Although the MA addition routine requires more steps than the 
most common verbal algorithm, it is also more accurate because it never requires storing 
partial sums.
7. conclusions.   Beller and Bender (2008) write that “there may be no other domain 
in the field of cognitive sciences where it is so obvious that language (i.e., the verbal 
numeration system) affects cognition (i.e., mental arithmetic).” The data reviewed here 
are consistent with this contention: how a language represents large exact quantities 
dramatically influences how its speakers are able to store and manipulate them. For this 
reason, number representation presents an important case to go beyond the first order 
questions of the Whorfian debate—“does language influence thought”—and ask detailed 
questions about how language participates in constructing representations of exact number 
and routines for manipulating quantities. Investigations of the richness of cross-cultural 
variation in number systems suggest that there are major behavioral consequences that 
correspond to what number words a language has and how those words are structured 
into a count list. More generally, the form of a numerical representation (linguistic or not) 
structures the kinds of routines for enumeration and arithmetic that can be performed.
 The data that lead to this conclusion could not have been gathered by the standard 
methods of cognitive psychology, nor by the standard methods of field linguistics. Many 
of the results cited here come from carefully controlled studies performed in the field with 
populations that possess culturally, linguistically, or cognitively interesting numerical 
representations. This generalization suggests the benefits of psycholinguistic fieldwork 
that combines experimental design with cross-cultural or cross-linguistic populations. 
Such fieldwork is especially important in the study of the diverse languages of Melanesia, 
since opportunities to study these languages are quickly disappearing. Future fieldwork—
on number and in other domains—should take advantage of these techniques to present a 
fuller picture of the relations between language, culture, and cognition.
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